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LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: DISABILITY, TITLE IX, AND 








In the United States, sports have long been a significant agent for social 
change. Jackie Robinson advanced race relations when he broke baseball’s 
color barrier in the mid-twentieth century.1 Female tennis legend Billie Jean 
King similarly challenged sex stereotypes when she defeated Bobby Riggs 
during the 1973 Battle of the Sexes.2 In addition to these popular cultural 
icons, various statutes and public policies have been implemented to prevent 
discrimination, level playing fields, and ensure inclusion. Legal protections 
have generated increased interest among young student athletes.3 While race 
and gender discrimination have been challenged by advances in athletics, 
disability discrimination remains mostly untouched by this historic means 
of social change. 
In 2017, A.H., a disabled high school student athlete in Illinois, sought 
to change this status quo.4 Under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), he sued the 
 
*   J.D. Candidate (2020), Washington University in St. Louis.  Thank you to my mom, Kathy 
Christophel, for first showing me the doors that meaningful opportunity can open—and always having 
the bravery to walk through them.  And thank you to my dad, Mark Christophel, for embodying grace, 
kindness, and humility in walking through those doors with her. 
1.  See Chris Lamb, ‘I Never Want to Take Another Trip Like This One’: Jackie Robinson’s Journey 
to Integrate Baseball, J. SPORT HIST. 177, 187 (1997) (“Robinson’s campaign against baseball’s color 
barrier captivated millions of white Americans who had thus far ignored the country’s racial dilemma. 
It also inspired millions of black Americans.”). 
2.  SUSAN WARE, GAME, SET, MATCH: BILLIE JEAN KING AND THE REVOLUTION IN WOMEN’S 
SPORTS 209 (2011) (“[B]y showing what women were capable of when given a sporting chance, she 
helped chip away at the old assumptions and barriers that had limited women’s full participation in all 
aspects of American life. Few public figures, let alone athletes, can point to such a deep and far-reaching 
legacy.”). 
3.  See infra text accompanying notes 34–35.  
4.  See discussion infra Section I.A. 
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Illinois High School Association (IHSA), seeking the creation of either a 
separate division or separate state championship qualifying standards for 
para-ambulatory students running track.5 The IHSA denied his reasonable 
accommodation request, and the Northern District of Illinois and Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the IHSA’s decision.6 At the Seventh 
Circuit, the majority subjected A.H.’s claim to a but-for test, requiring proof 
that but for his disability, A.H. would have qualified for the state 
championship.7 
The dissent argued that this but-for test failed to adequately protect the 
spirit of the ADA.8 The ADA requires that covered entities provide 
meaningful access to persons with disabilities.9 “Meaningful access” means 
providing disabled persons a substantially equivalent experience to that of 
able-bodied persons.10 In civil rights statutes, the concept of meaningful 
access has been most prominent in remedying disability- and sex-based 
discrimination. As the dissent in A.H. noted, Title IX granted female athletes 
separate competitive divisions because of physiological differences.11 
Disabled persons should receive similar accommodations, as they too have 
basic physiological differences that directly affect their ability to compete 
in athletic events. Without separate divisions or qualifying times, many 
disabled student athletes cannot have an experience—the opportunity to 
qualify for a state championship—that is substantially similar to the 
experience enjoyed by able-bodied student athletes.  
This note argues that the Seventh Circuit should have used a two-part 
meaningful-access test to evaluate A.H.’s claim. This note further contends 
that Title IX, as civil rights legislation designed to remedy historic 
discrimination based on physiological differences, should inform our 
understanding of meaningful access. Under this analysis, federal courts 
should require high school athletic associations to create separate divisions 
or qualifying times for para-ambulatory student athletes. This separate 
classification would ensure that para-ambulatory student athletes have the 
 
5.  See infra text accompanying note 92. A “para-ambulatory” athlete is one who, in contrast to a 
wheelchair athlete, is physically disabled yet remains ambulatory. See also infra note 84. 
6.  See infra text accompanying notes 94, 100. 
7.  See infra text accompanying note 102. 
8.  See infra text accompanying note 110. 
9.  See infra text accompanying note 50. 
10.  See infra text accompanying notes 63–69. 
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opportunity to meaningfully access high school sports by competing against 
their similarly situated peers. 
Part I of this note examines the history of Title IX, the Rehabilitation 
Act, and the ADA. It focuses primarily on Title IX’s sports law application 
and the ADA’s understanding of “meaningful access.” Part II argues that 
the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and surrounding precedent favor adoption of 
the two-part meaningful-access test. It further contends that when informed 
by Title IX, the need for separate divisions or qualifying times becomes 
even clearer. Part III recommends that ADA compliance should require the 
creation of separate divisions or qualifying times for para-ambulatory 
student athletes. This Note concludes that American civil rights law should 
follow the path of substantive equality for persons with disabilities. 
 
I. HISTORY 
A. Title IX: Early Issues of Sports Inclusion 
 
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 created a national 
mandate that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”12 The implementing regulations drafted by the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)13 explicitly 
prohibited sex-based discrimination in “any interscholastic . . . athletics 
offered by a recipient” of federal funds.14 While most federal 
antidiscrimination laws to date, like Title VII, pursued a principle of either 
racial or gender blindness, Title IX sparked a national debate about how to 
best achieve sex15 equality in athletics: should the regulations pursue a sex-
 
12.  20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018). 
13.  HEW was a forerunner to the Department of Health and Human Services and Department of 
Education. See A Common Thread of Service: A History of the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, OFF. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION, https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/common-
thread-service/history-department-health-education-and-welfare [https://perma.cc/3G9T-XXMY].  
14.  34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2018). 
15.  Many commentaries and original sources use the terms “gender” and “sex” interchangeably when 
discussing Title IX and its surrounding regulations and policy implications. This note uses “sex” unless 
directly citing another source that uses “gender.” 
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blind formal equality or a results-oriented substantive equality?16 
Substantive equality ultimately prevailed.17 
Title IX’s implementing regulations sought “more substantive measures 
of equal opportunity . . . . Title IX’s allowance for sex separation has 
facilitated a legal approach that emphasize[d] results over process and actual 
opportunities for girls and women over a more formal gender neutrality.”18 
In total, the implementing regulations reflected what many scholars describe 
as a “separate but equal” approach to antidiscrimination.19 
The two key provisions of HEW’s athletics-related implementing 
regulations are 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) and (b).20 The regulations begin “with 
a strong statement endorsing gender integration in sports”:21 
(a) General. No persons shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, be 
treated differently from another person or otherwise be 
discriminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, 
club or intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and no 
recipient shall provide any such athletics separately on 
such basis.22 
Immediately following this section, however, is an “exception that 
swallows the rule”:23 
 
16.  See, e.g., DEBORAH L. BRAKE, GETTING IN THE GAME: TITLE IX AND THE WOMEN’S SPORTS 
REVOLUTION 19 (2010). “Lawyers at HEW quickly realized that the desegregation model for enforcing 
Title VI, which covers discrimination in federally funded schools, could not simply be replicated in Title 
IX. They recognized that competitive sport was a particularly thorny area for developing measures of 
gender equality.” Id. 
17.  Id. at 17 (“Title IX has done a relatively good job of forging a pragmatic approach to structuring 
sports opportunities for girls and women. In forsaking gender blindness for a more gender-conscious, 
result-oriented model, Title IX has chosen substantive equality over formal equality. This choice has 
created the potential for expanding girls’ and women’s sports participation and inciting broad-based 
cultural transformation in society’s response to female athletes and to women’s roles more generally.”). 
18.  Id. at 15.  
19.  KELLY BELANGER, INVISIBLE SEASONS: TITLE IX AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUITY IN COLLEGE 
SPORTS 73 (2016); see also WELCH SUGGS, Heroines as Well as Heroes, in EQUAL PLAY: TITLE IX AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE 14, 19 (Nancy Hogshead-Makar & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 2007) (“Women’s officials 
pressed the point that women needed sex-segregated sports programs. Thus, women created perhaps the 
only context in civil rights law where ‘separate but equal’ was tolerated and even endorsed.”). 
20.  BRAKE, supra note 16, at 21–22. 
21.  Id.  
22.  34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2018) (emphasis added). 
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(b) Separate Teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this section, a recipient may operate or 
sponsor separate teams for members of each sex where 
selection for such teams is based on competitive skill or the 
activity involved is a contact sport.24 
Because “team selection is always based on competitive skill” at the 
varsity level, sex-separated teams became the general rule of Title IX’s 
regulatory framework.25 The HEW determined that “gender neutrality in 
team tryouts is insufficient to provide real equality for women in sport.”26 
At the time, feminist advocates argued that “physiological sex differences 
in strength, height, and weight . . . would exclude large numbers of 
interested and skilled women in most sports if they were required to 
compete with men.”27 
In practice, the HEW regulations created an affirmative mandate: “a 
school must do more than merely allow females to try out for males’ 
teams.”28 “Effective accommodation” requires that institutions create sex-
separate non-contact sports teams where: 
(1) The opportunities for members of the excluded sex 
have historically been limited; 
(2) There is sufficient interest and ability among 
members of the excluded sex to sustain a viable team and a 
reasonable expectation of intercollegiate competition for 
that team; and 
(3) Members of the excluded sex do not possess 
sufficient skill to be selected for a single integrated team, 
or to compete actively on such a team if selected.29 
 
24.  34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2018). 
25.  BRAKE, supra note 16, at 22. 
26.  Id. 
27.  BELANGER, supra note 19, at 75–76. 
28.  LINDA JEAN CARPENTER & R. VIVIAN ACOSTA, TITLE IX 74 (2005). 
29.  Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX and 
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979). HEW intended these regulations to apply 
to interscholastic athletic programs—in addition to “intercollegiate competition[s]”: “This Policy 
Interpretation is designed specifically for intercollegiate athletics. However, its general principles will 
often apply to club, intramural, and interscholastic athletic programs, which are also covered by 
regulation. Accordingly, the Policy Interpretation may be used for guidance by the administrators of 
such programs when appropriate.” Id. at 71,413–14. 
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These regulations were grounded in an understanding that “simply 
requiring a school to permit a tryout may in some cases be a sham and a 
hollow victory for the female interested in playing a particular sport.”30 
Many at the time held this concern: 
Some male athletics directors believed they could 
accommodate women in sports simply by opening tryouts 
to everyone, male and female: Women could go out for a 
team and get cut because they were too small, too slow, or 
lacked other skills, but the school would have protected its 
legal obligations. But that end run around the law never 
became popular. Women’s officials pressed the point that 
women needed sex-segregated sports programs.31 
These female advocates believed that a “gender blind approach has 
often been a strategy for thwarting more substantive measures of 
equality.”32 Justice Stevens later expressed similar concerns, noting that 
“[w]ithout a gender-based classification in competitive contact sports, there 
would be a substantial risk that boys would dominate the girls' programs 
and deny them an equal opportunity to compete in interscholastic events.”33 
Ultimately, the sex-conscious approach adopted by Title IX’s 
regulations—rather than a sex-blind, integrationist approach—produced the 
broad-based participatory results for which the statute is historically 
 
30.  CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 28, at 75.  
31.  SUGGS, supra note 19. 
32.  BRAKE, supra note 16, at 26. Brake notes that scholars in the more liberal feminist tradition have 
criticized the “separate but equal” position: 
Separating women from men in athletic competition sends the message that men 
are better athletes. After all, the judicial rationale for preserving sex-separation in 
sports . . . assumes that gender-blind selection would leave female athletes with 
fewer opportunities because they cannot hold their own against male athletes. 
This message . . . has led some supporters of gender equality to . . . argue[] that 
sex segregation in sports “fosters the myth of male supremacy” and “perpetuates 
the sex role stereotype of women as passive and weak.” 
Id. at 29. 
33.  See O’Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 449 U.S. 1301, 1307 (Stevens, Circuit Justice 1980) (finding sex-
based eligibility for athletic programs to be a legitimate criterion, despite a female student’s desire to try 
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famous.34 Over time, “Title IX increased the supply of athletic opportunities 
which, in turn, created its own demand” among female students.35 
 
B. “Meaningful Access”: Disability Rights & Sports Inclusion 
 
In 1973, President Nixon signed into law the Rehabilitation Act, section 
504 of which prohibits an “otherwise qualified individual with a disability” 
from being “excluded from the participation in, be[ing] denied the benefits 
of, or be[ing] subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance” “solely by reason of her or his 
disability.”36 These “program[s] or activit[ies]” include “all of the 
operations of . . . [an] instrumentality of a State or of a local government . . 
. any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.”37 This 
legislation, while historically significant, was relatively limited in scope, as 
it only applied to entities receiving federal funds.38 Thus, although the 
Rehabilitation Act covered schools receiving federal funds, it did not 
necessarily compel any action by high school athletic associations. But 
these private associations would later fall under the state-actor prong of the 
ADA.39 
To expand the scope of federal disability-rights protections, the ADA 
was signed into law in 1990 with the stated goal of eliminating 
“discrimination against individuals with disabilities,”40 which historically 
took the form of “intentional exclusion, . . . failure to make modifications 
 
34.  BRAKE, supra note 16, at 37 (“Title IX’s biggest success, and its most revolutionary impact in 
terms of producing cultural transformation, is the huge increase in the number of girls who grew up 
playing organized sports, with many of them continuing to do so into adulthood. This, much more than 
the accomplishments of a few elite athletes, has had the greatest impact on changing the place of women 
in society. Although celebrity athletes also have an important influence on the culture and provide role 
models for other female athletes, it is the advent of girls and women participating in sport in mass 
numbers that has been truly revolutionary.”). 
35.  ROGER I. ABRAMS, SPORTS JUSTICE: THE LAW & THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 97 (2010). 
36.  29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018). 
37.  29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2018). 
38.  Lisa A. Lavelle, Note, The Duty to Accommodate: Will Title I of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act Emancipate Individuals with Disabilities Only to Disable Small Businesses?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1135, 1139 (1991) (noting that while the ADA applies to many private actors, the Rehabilitation 
Act was limited to entities receiving federal funding, such as schools and government contractors). 
39.  See infra note 48. However, the IHSA is covered by the Rehabilitation Act, as it does receive 
federal funds. Complaint at 7, A.H. v. Illinois High School Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 3d 705 (N.D. Ill. 2017) 
(No. 1:16-cv-01959). 
40.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2018). 







178           Washington University Journal of Law and Policy         [Vol. 62 
 
 
to existing . . . practices, [and] exclusionary qualification standards and 
criteria.”41 The ADA defines “disability” as: 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities of such individual;  
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.42 
“Major life activities” include actions such as walking, standing, lifting, 
bending, and breathing.43 As a national mandate, the ADA was designed to 
seek “equality of opportunity [and] full participation . . . for such 
individuals.”44 Within this mandate, federal regulations gave additional 
clarification: covered entities were to offer these accommodations and 
services in the “most integrated setting appropriate.”45 This integration must 
avoid paternalistic, “overprotective rules and policies.”46 These inclusion 
objectives encompass sports.47 Inclusion of persons with disabilities became 
sports law’s next civil rights frontier. These laws fully applied to 
interscholastic athletic associations, which are considered state actors 
because of their entwinement with other state entities.48 
Over time, these two landmark pieces of disability-rights legislation 
have been interpreted jointly and consistently.49 Both the Rehabilitation Act 
and the ADA have been interpreted as protecting the meaningful-access, 
 
41.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2018). 
42.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2018). 
43.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2018). 
44.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2018). 
45.  28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (2018). 
46.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2018); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 85 
(2002) (“Congress had paternalism in its sights when it passed the ADA . . . .”); Knapp v. Nw. Univ., 
101 F.3d 473, 485–86 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that decisions related to persons with disabilities cannot 
rest on paternalistic concerns). 
47.  “[D]iscrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as . . . 
recreation . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3). 
48.  Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 290–91 (2001) (finding 
that statewide interscholastic athletic associations are state actors, particularly where their funds and 
leadership come primarily from public schools located within a state). 
49.  Federal courts construe and apply the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act consistently 
with each other. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998); Allmond v. Akal Sec. Inc., 558 
F.3d 1312, 1316 n.3 (11th Cir. 2009); Enica v. Principi, 544 F.3d 328, 338 n.11 (1st Cir. 2008); Doe v. 
Salvation Army in the U.S., 531 F.3d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 2008). This is because “the relevant provisions 
and implementing regulations of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are ‘materially identical.’” A.H. 
v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 881 F.3d 587, 592 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Steimel v. Wernert, 823 F.3d 902, 
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opportunity, and participation rights of persons with disabilities.50 As the 
Ninth Circuit noted in 2016, “A plaintiff may establish prohibited 
discrimination under section 504 and Title II [of the ADA] by showing that 
a public entity denied her a ‘reasonable accommodation’ necessary to 
achieve meaningful access to her education.”51 Because of the generally 
limited amount of ADA precedent, defining “meaningful access” within the 
context of high school athletics requires understanding the term’s use in a 
broad variety of contexts.52 
In an education context, federal courts have found that “meaningful 
access” requires “an opportunity to make use of [the provided benefit] that 
is roughly similar to that which is afforded other students. [Students with 
disabilities] need not succeed equally, but they must have an equivalent 
opportunity to succeed, or the benefit is not meaningful.”53 Ultimately, “[a]n 
open door is not enough: the opportunities provided must be fair in light of 
the opportunities provided to people without disabilities.”54 If a public 
entity’s policies even deter participation by a person with disabilities, 
meaningful access may have been denied because deterrence threatens “the 
ADA's remedial goals of eliminating widespread discrimination against the 
disabled and integrating the disabled into the mainstream of American 
life.”55 In Celeste v. East Meadow Union Free School District, the Second 
Circuit noted that architectural barriers can, like institutional policies, have 
 
50.  See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (finding that section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act requires that “an otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with 
meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers. . . . [T]o assure meaningful access, reasonable 
accommodations in the grantee's program or benefit may have to be made.”); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 
331 F.3d 261, 291 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that “injunctive relief to remedy a violation of the ADA or 
Rehabilitation Act is appropriate if it provides the injured plaintiff with ‘meaningful access’ to the 
programs or services to which the plaintiff is facially entitled”). 
51.  See A.G. v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 815 F.3d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(finding the district court had improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s claims and failed to provide access to 
education when it denied reasonable accommodations for art and musical educational opportunities). 
52.  See Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, Debilitating Alexander v. Choate: “Access” to 
Health Care for People with Disabilities, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447, 453 (noting that “[t]hese cases 
that define ‘meaningful access’ involve a wide spectrum of issues, ranging from education, to 
transportation, to governmental facilities, and to health care”). 
53.  Id. at 460 (defining “meaningful access” in terms of the baseline experience that nondisabled 
persons enjoy). 
54.  Id. As a starting point, Francis and Silvers’s analysis centers not on the experience of the disabled 
person but on the experience of the nondisabled person. Id.  
55.  See Kreisler v. Second Ave. Diner Corp., 731 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Doran v. 7-
Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008)). The court further noted that “deterrence constitutes 
an injury under the ADA.” Id. at 188. 
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a deterrent effect and therefore deny a person with disabilities meaningful 
access to programming.56 There, a school’s architectural barriers, which 
increased the plaintiff’s walking time to practice by twenty minutes, 
detracted from his position as the football team manager, and reduced his 
physical education class time by half, thereby denying him meaningful 
access to the programs provided to all other students.57  
Courts have similarly found that the meaningful-access mandate 
“requires just that—granting [prison] inmates meaningful participation in 
prison activities and programs.”58 Limited participation is insufficient if the 
limitation occurs because of a barrier to access.59 Meaningful access 
requires the provision of “reasonable auxiliary aids and services to afford    
. . . an equal opportunity to gain the same benefit as [the plaintiff’s] 
nondisabled peers.”60 Deterring participation is likewise a concern.61 An 
accommodation attempt “is not plainly reasonable if it is so inadequate that 
it deters the plaintiff from attempting to access the services otherwise 
available to him.”62 
The Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have condensed meaningful-
access analysis in an ADA and Rehabilitation Act context into a two-part 
evaluation. First, the allegedly offending entity must begin by “considering 
how their facilities [or benefits] are used by nondisabled guests.”63 Then, 
the allegedly offending entity must take “reasonable steps to provide 
disabled guests with a ‘like experience.’”64 Thus, access alone is 
 
56.  See Celeste v. E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 373 F. App'x 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2010). 
57.  See id. 
58.  See Wright v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 831 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2016). 
59.  See Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 858 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding a failure to provide 
meaningful access when a deaf inmate had only limited participation in a prison’s internal disciplinary 
process because the prison failed to provide an interpreter or other accommodation). 
60.  See Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2013). 
61.  See Wright, 831 F.3d at 73.  
62.  See id. (finding that the New York Department of Corrections’s blanket ban on motorized 
wheelchairs and provision of a manual wheelchair or rotating on-request mobility aids did not constitute 
a reasonable accommodation and thus failed to offer disabled prisoners the opportunity to have 
“meaningful participation” in prison activities, as required by the ADA and Rehabilitation Act). 
63.  A.L. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc., 900 F.3d 1270, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018) (applying 
the two-part meaningful-access test to Disney parks); see also Argenyi, 703 F.3d at 449 (applying the 
two-part meaningful-access test to educational programs); Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co., 685 
F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying the two-part meaningful-access test to Disney parks).  
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insufficient; access must be meaningful.65 For example, in Kalani v. 
Starbucks Coffee Co., the Ninth Circuit applied this test when it affirmed 
the district court’s finding of an ADA violation.66 Although Starbucks had 
provided wall-facing accessible seating, it failed to provide interior-facing 
accessible seating.67 This constituted a denial of a comparable experience 
because Starbucks “deprived its wheelchair-bound customers of the 
opportunity to participate, to the same extent as non-disabled patrons, in the 
social aspects of the ‘full and rewarding coffee house experience’ Starbucks 
Company consciously affords its able-bodied patrons.”68 Ultimately, “[a] 
facility, program, or piece of technology would not be accessible if it did 
not provide an experience for people with disabilities that is as close as 
reasonably possible to the experience of people without disabilities.”69 
  
C. A.H. v. Illinois High School Association 
 
In 2018, the Seventh Circuit was faced with the question of meaningful 
access in high school athletics.70 A.H., a high school student athlete, filed 
suit against the IHSA, alleging the IHSA violated the ADA when it denied 
his requested disability accommodations.71 A.H. has various physical 
disabilities, including spastic quadriplegia related to cerebral palsy.72 A.H.’s 
disabilities limit the range of motion in his hip, knee, and ankle and cause 
an abnormal gait pattern and involuntary movements.73 These disabilities 
directly affect his ability to run.74 As an athlete, A.H. falls within the 
 
65.  See Argenyi, 703 F.3d at 448-49 (defining “meaningful access” as “an equal opportunity to gain 
the same benefit as [one’s] nondisabled peers”). 
66.  See Kalani v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 698 F. App'x 883, 886–87 (9th Cir. 2017). 
67.  See Kalani v. Starbucks Corp., 117 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015), vacated as moot in 
part by 698 F. App'x 883 (9th Cir. 2017). 
68.  See Kalani, 698 F. App'x at 887. 
69.  Tiffany Lee, Biometrics and Disability Rights: Legal Compliance in Biometric Identification 
Programs, 2016 U. ILL. J.L., TECH. & POL'Y 209, 228 (2016) (noting that the ADA imposes a “high 
standard of accessibility,” which requires provision of “equal enjoyment,” rather than “mere access”); 
see also Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 652 (2d Cir. 1982) (“It is not enough to open the door 
for the handicapped . . . ; a ramp must be built so the door can be reached.”). 
70.  A.H. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 881 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2018). 
71.  A.H. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 3d 705, 713 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
72.  Id. at 711.  
73.  Id.  
74.  A.H. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 881 F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 2018).  The district court offered 
additional detail: “These disabilities adversely affect the basic mechanics of running, which require an 
athlete to balance, flex, extend, and propel his body by coordinating the movements on all four limbs. 
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International Paralympic Committee’s (IPC) T-36 classification, a category 
of athletes with mobility and coordination impairments.75 The IPC 
maintains these classes so that athletes “can compete with other athletes of 
like ability.”76 
Despite his disabilities, A.H. competed on Evanston High School’s 
track and cross-country teams for his entire high school career.77 
Throughout his time on the team, he received track leadership awards.78 
A.H. additionally competed locally and nationally in adaptive sports 
competitions, including the 2016 U.S. Paralympic Trials.79 He was “seen as 
an ‘elite’ and ‘up and coming’ athlete who may well compete internationally 
in the future.”80 In 2017, A.H.’s coach selected him to represent Evanston 
High School in the spring sectional’s 1600-meter race, an event that 
qualifies athletes to the state championship.81 The IHSA, the state’s 
interscholastic high school athletics regulatory and organizing body, allows 
runners who either place first or second or achieve a specific qualifying time 
to advance to the state championship.82 While the IHSA has distinct 
qualifying times and divisions for boys, girls, wheelchair athletes, and small 
 
For example, A.H. cannot push off on his toes in the way that an able-bodied runner would.” A.H., 263 
F. Supp. 3d at 711. 
75.  Id. 
76.  Appellant’s Brief at 3 n.2, A.H. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 881 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-
02456). 
77.  A.H., 263 F. Supp. 3d at 711. 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. at 711–12. 
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schools,83 para-ambulatory track athletes84 are subject to the same 
qualifying time requirements as able-bodied track athletes of their sex and 
school classification.85 This is despite the fact that Illinois has one of the 
highest concentrations of para-ambulatory cerebral palsy athletes in the 
United States.86 At the sectional competition, A.H. was unable to meet the 
IHSA’s qualifying times, which even world-record holding runners with 
A.H.’s disability classification could not achieve.87 IHSA Class 3A—A.H.’s 
high school’s classification88—has a 100-meter dash state qualifying time 
of 0:10.99.89 Meanwhile, the International Paralympic men’s world-record 
holder for all ages in A.H.’s disability class, T-36, ran the 100-meter dash 
 
83.  Complaint, supra note 39, at 10–11. A.H., in his complaint, explained: 
For example, IHSA maintains a policy regarding the grouping and seeding 
of state championships based on geography. . . . Through the use of geographic-
based sectionals, IHSA seeks to advance the “geographic principle” that “the 
State Series is designed to determine a State Champion. The State Series is not 
intended to necessarily advance the best teams in the state to the State Final.”  
Additionally, this geographic principle results in competitors in individual 
sports, like track and field and swimming, advancing to the state championship 
even when they do not meet the qualifying times.  
IHSA also provides different qualifying standards for state championship 
meets in some sports depending on the number of students enrolled at a high 
school. . . . Smaller high schools have lower qualifying standards than larger 
schools. . . . IHSA also provides different qualifying standards based on gender. 
Male and female student athletes have different qualifying standards for state 
championship meets in every sport and event. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
84.  The IPC categorizes athletes as para-ambulatory if they possess disabilities that impede “the 
ability to control legs [or] trunks” but they nonetheless have sufficient leg and trunk function to compete 
standing.  This class contrasts with disabled athletes who must compete while sitting in a wheelchair. 
INTERNATIONAL PARALYMPIC COMMITTEE, EXPLANATORY GUIDE TO PARALYMPIC CLASSIFICATION: 
PARALYMPIC SUMMER SPORTS 8-9 (2015), 
https://www.paralympic.org/sites/default/files/document/150915170806821_2015_09_15%2BExplana
tory%2Bguide%2BClassification_summer%2BFINAL%2B_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD24-A8H7]. Per 
the Paralympic Classification rules, “[t]he presence of an eligible impairment must be proven by means 
of medical diagnostic information . . . .” Id. at 3. 
85.  See A.H., 263 F. Supp. 3d at 712. 
86.  Complaint, supra note 39, at 109. 
87.  A.H., 263 F. Supp. 3d at 712 (“It is undisputed that even the world record holders for runners with 
A.H.'s disability classification would not meet IHSA's qualifying times to compete at the state track 
meet.”). 
88.  Appellant’s Brief, supra note 76, at 4. 
89.  2017 Boys Track & Field Qualifying Standards, ILL. HIGH SCH. ASS’N, 
https://www.ihsa.org/documents/trb/2016-17/2017%20TRB%20Qualifying%20Standards.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4BNE-8LBM]. 
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in 0:11.87.90 The 200-, 400-, and 800-meter races all have similar disparities 
between the T-36 world-record holder and the IHSA’s Class 3A qualifying 
times.91 
After the sectional competition, A.H. made a reasonable 
accommodation request to the IHSA, seeking (1) the creation of state finals 
qualifying time standards for para-ambulatory athletes and (2) a para-
ambulatory division for an annual IHSA five-kilometer race.92 As A.H. 
noted in his complaint, at least three other states—California, Louisiana, 
and Oregon—have “similar time standard accommodations for [para-
ambulatory] students in track and field.”93 The IHSA’s Executive Director 
denied the reasonable accommodation request, and the IHSA Board 
affirmed his decision on appeal.94 Board members indicated that they 
believed granting A.H.’s reasonable accommodation request would “give 
him an unfair competitive advantage compared to able-bodied students 
because he would have a greater opportunity to advance to state 
championships from the section competition given the much smaller 
number of competitors he would face.”95 
A.H. brought claims under section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act,96 
Title II of the ADA,97 and Title III of the ADA,98 arguing that the IHSA’s 
 
90.  IPC SPORT DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, WORLD PARA ATHLETICS WORLD RECORDS, 
https://db.ipc-services.org/sdms/web/record/at/pdf/type/WR/category/out/gender/M 
[https://perma.cc/6XLE-425M]. 
91.  The T-36 200-meter world record time is 0:24:09, while the IHSA’s Class 3A qualifying time is 
0:22.26. The T-36 400-meter world record time is 0:53.31, while the IHSA’s Class 3A qualifying time 
is 0:50.10. The T-36 800-meter world record time is 2:02.39, while IHSA’s Class 3A qualifying time is 
1:57.31. See id.; see also ILL. HIGH SCH. ASS’N, supra note 89. 
92.  A.H. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 3d 705, 712 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
93.  Complaint, supra note 39, at 12. 
94.  A.H., 263 F. Supp. 3d at 712-13. 
95.  Id. at 713. 
96.  Id. “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by 
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018). 
97.  See A.H., 263 F. Supp. 3d at 713. “[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of 
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132 
(2018). 
98.  See A.H., 263 F. Supp. 3d at 713. “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of 
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), 
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policies denied him a “meaningful opportunity” to qualify for state finals.99 
The district court granted IHSA’s motion for summary judgment, and the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed on two grounds.100 First, the Seventh Circuit 
rejected A.H.’s framing of the desired benefit—“a meaningful opportunity 
to qualify for State,”101—holding that A.H must prove that “‘but for’ his 
disability, he would have been able to access the services or benefits 
desired,” which the court defined as actual qualification for the state 
championship.102 The court found that A.H. did not establish that “he would 
qualify for State if he were not disabled” because “the demanding qualifying 
times . . . exclude able-bodied and disabled runners alike, leaving 90% of 
all runners, many thousands, in fact, from participating at State every year. 
Simply put, the qualifying times ensure that the State championship meet is 
reserved for the best and fastest runners in Illinois.” 103 Ultimately, the court 
argued that “the odds are overwhelming that runners like A.H. would not 
meet the qualifying times even if they were not disabled.”104 
Second, the Seventh Circuit found that A.H.’s reasonable 
accommodation request was unreasonable as a matter of law.105 Creating a 
new division or lowering qualifying times would—according to the 
majority—“make it easier for certain runners to qualify for State or medal 
in the [5K],” thus “fundamentally alter[ing] the nature of the” 
competitions.106 This would “undermine the competitiveness” of the races 
and thus fundamentally alter the nature of the program.107 The court defined 
the “essential nature” of a race as “run[ning] a designated distance in the 
shortest time possible.”108 The court argued that granting the reasonable 
accommodation request “gives a disabled athlete an advantage over others,” 
which would fundamentally—and unreasonably—alter the essential nature 
of the sport, thereby defeating the reasonable accommodation request.109 
 
99.  A.H., 263 F. Supp. 3d at 721. A.H. also brought an Equal Protection claim, which is not relevant 
for the purposes of this discussion. Id. at 713. 
100.  See A.H. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 881 F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 2018). 
101.  Id. at 593 (emphasis added). 
102.  Id. (quoting Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 849 (7th Cir. 1999)).  
103.  A.H., 881 F.3d at 594. 
104.  Id. at 594. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. at 594–95. 
107.  Id. at 594. 
108.  Id. at 595. 
109.  Id. 
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D. Judge Rovner’s Dissent 
 
Critiquing the majority’s but-for requirement, Judge Rovner dissented 
that such causal tests in the disability context are “absurd pursuit[s]” that 
are impossible to prove and that undermine the purpose of the ADA.110 
Indeed, “trying to imagine a world in which A.H. is not disabled[] is not a 
fruitful exercise.”111 Judge Rovner concluded that granting A.H.’s 
reasonable accommodation request would offer him the opportunity for 
meaningful participation in high school track competitions.112 It would not 
“alter the fundamental nature of the program,” as the majority claimed.113 
Rather, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require the IHSA to create a new 
para-ambulatory division and qualifying times for the same reason the IHSA 
created separate divisions for female runners and wheelchair athletes: 
athletes should race against their peers who share similar immutable 
characteristics.114 
The program’s “fundamental nature” already included mechanisms to 
grant runners other than Illinois’s “absolute fastest” greater access to finals: 
Schools may only send to sectionals their top two runners—even if they 
have Illinois’ five best runners—so that other schools with less “qualified” 
athletes can send students, too.115 And the IHSA has lower qualifying times 
for women, wheelchair athletes, and athletes from small schools.116 As 
Rovner noted, these “accommodations” have not “undermined” track’s 
competitiveness, and neither would A.H.’s reasonable accommodation 
request.117 As she stated, granting this reasonable accommodation request 
 
110.  Id. at 597 (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
111.  Id. “Had A.H. been born in an entirely different body, one that did not have cerebral palsy, would 
he be in the top 10% of runners? How can we know what his body would have been like but for his 
disability. [sic] Would it have been more muscular? Would his heart have been stronger? Would he be 
taller, with longer legs?” Id. 
112.  Id. at 599. 
113.  Id. at 598. 
114.  Id. 
115.  Id. at 599. 
116.  Id. at 598. 
117.  Id. at 598. Judge Rovner continued: 
I wholeheartedly reject the notion that allowing separate divisions for women and 
disabled persons somehow “undermines the competitiveness” of a sporting event 
or denigrates the accomplishments of elite male athletes. This is akin to saying 
that allowing women to run in Olympic track events, where the qualifying times 
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would offer A.H. “the meaningful opportunity to compete against his peer 
group for a chance to qualify for the state finals.”118 
Judge Rovner analogized the creation of a separate para-ambulatory 
athlete category to the creation of separate categories for female athletes,119 
which was prompted in large part by Title IX.120 She argued that the 
“essential nature” of track events is to run “in the shortest period of time as 
compared to one’s peer group.”121 Thus, A.H.—like women before Title 
IX—sought to have the same opportunity to participate as his peers.122 As 
Judge Rovner noted, “a non-disabled runner who has the magic mix of 
drive, determination, ability to train, good coaching, resources, genetic 
make-up, and luck has the opportunity, albeit small, to make it to the state 
finals.”123 However, because of A.H.’s physical disability, no amount of 
these features or opportunities would allow him to reach the state 
championship.124 Thus, the “benefit” that A.H. sought—and should be 





In the ADA and Rehabilitation Act contexts, defining meaningful 
access in terms of the Seventh Circuit’s but-for test undermines the spirit of 
 
events. As A.H. argued, “under IHSA’s theory, allowing Serena Williams to play 
tennis at Wimbledon or Katie [Ledecky] to swim at the Olympics would somehow 
‘strip’ those competitions of their identity and prestige, devaluing the 
achievements of Roger Federer and Michael Phelps.” 
Id. (quoting Appellant’s Brief, supra note 76, at 32). 
118.  Id. at 599. 
119.  It is nonetheless important to note that federal anti-discrimination law affords different degrees of 
protection to the suspect classifications of sex and disability. Compare Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 
137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (finding sex-based classifications subject to a heightened intermediate scrutiny), 
with City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (finding disability-based 
classifications subject to rational basis review). 
120.  See A.H., 881 F.3d at 596 (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
121.  Id. at 598. Judge Rovner continued to contest the majority’s framing of the essential nature of a 
track race as “running in the shortest period of time,” noting that “[n]o one would think it fair if Usain 
Bolt signed up to compete in the IHSA state finals despite the fact that he could surely run the designated 
course in the shortest period of time.” Id. 
122.  Id. at 597. 
123.  Id. 
124.  See id. 
125.  Id. 







188           Washington University Journal of Law and Policy         [Vol. 62 
 
 
the anti-discrimination statutes. When viewed through the holistic body of 
American anti-discrimination law, A.H. v. IHSA was incorrectly decided 
because the court did not consider A.H.’s reasonable accommodation 
request under a meaningful-access standard. The ADA’s preamble states 
that discrimination against persons with disabilities has often taken the form 
of exclusionary qualification standards.126 When the Seventh Circuit 
rejected A.H.’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, the court further 
entrenched the IHSA’s exclusionary qualification standards. Rather than 
first considering how nondisabled students use the program,127 the court 
instead focused on how A.H. uses the program. The court argued that A.H.’s 
claims failed because he had not proven that but for his disability,128 he 
would have been able to access the services or benefits he desired: 
qualifying for the state track and field championship.129 This but-for 
question cannot be effectively answered because—as Judge Rovner argued 
in her dissent—the court has no way to conclusively determine what an 
individual athlete’s skill would have been without his disability.130 Title 
IX’s implementing regulations reject exactly this reasoning. Those 
regulations do not require women prove that but for their sex they would be 
able to effectively compete with men in order to merit access to a separate 
sports team.131 The regulations instead correctly start with the premise that 
physiological differences matter in athletics in very tangible ways, and 
athletic divisions should account for these distinctions. These distinctions 
cannot always be crystallized or quantified. But, because they exist for a 
large swath of the population, they are presumed to be significant enough to 
merit protection. In female, wheeling, and other separate divisions, we do 
not consider the protected group as receiving an “unfair competitive 
advantage”132 for their separate competitive category; nor should we for 
para-ambulatory athletes. 
Rather than the but-for test, the Seventh Circuit should have applied the 
two-part Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit analysis, which would have 
 
126.  See supra text accompanying note 41. 
127.  See supra text accompanying note 63. 
128.  See supra text accompanying notes 102–104.  
129.  A.H. argued that he only sought the opportunity to qualify, not qualification itself. See supra text 
accompanying note 101. 
130.  See supra text accompanying notes 110–111. 
131.  See supra text accompanying notes 18–19. 
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used able-bodied student athletes as a baseline. In A.H.’s context, the IHSA 
track-and-field competitions are used by nondisabled students to race 
against their physiologically similar peers.133 Boys and girls have separate 
qualifying times.134 Small schools compete against small schools based on 
the assumption that there is less physiological diversity or are fewer 
resources in small schools.135 A reasonable accommodation would ensure 
that A.H. has an experience “as close as reasonably possible to the 
experience” of his nondisabled peers.136  
Analyzing A.H.’s case under the two-part analysis would have led to, 
as Judge Rovner argued in her dissent, truly meaningful access, upholding 
the original spirit of the ADA.137 A.H. was denied a meaningful opportunity 
to qualify for Illinois state high school track and field finals. Other student 
athletes qualify against their peers; para-ambulatory student athletes are 
forced to race against fully ambulatory competitors. As Judge Rovner noted, 
A.H. did not seek guaranteed success.138 He did not seek an “unfair 
competitive advantage.”139 He did not seek to fundamentally alter the nature 
of the program. The accommodation sought was merely the opportunity to 
compete against his peers, not a guarantee of victory.140 Rather than 
considering the underlying purpose of the ADA, the Seventh Circuit instead 
opted for a narrow, blind, formalistic equality.  
Even if the Seventh Circuit rejected the two-part test, other existing 
meaningful-access case law could have changed the outcome. The Second 
Circuit found that barriers that deter participation by persons with 
disabilities constitute a meaningful access violation.141 To have truly 
meaningful access, persons with disabilities must have an “equal 
opportunity to gain the same benefit” as their nondisabled peers.142 
 
133.  See supra text accompanying note 121. 
134.  See supra text accompanying note 116. 
135.  See supra text accompanying note 116. 
136.   See supra text accompanying notes 63–69.  
137.  See supra text accompanying notes 110, 118. 
138.  See supra text accompanying note 125. 
139.  See supra text accompanying note 117. 
140.  See supra text accompanying notes 119–125. Further, had the Seventh Circuit granted A.H. a 
reasonable accommodation, even less-competitive para-ambulatory athletes would have benefitted, as 
they would have received the same accommodation. This is further evidence that A.H. was not 
attempting to change the fundamental nature of the program. Para-ambulatory athletes—regardless of 
ability—would have competed in this new category. 
141.  See supra text accompanying notes 56–62.  
142.  See supra text accompanying note 60. 
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Similarly, granting only limited participation to persons with disabilities 
denies them meaningful access.143 While the Second Circuit has not 
explicitly adopted the two-part analysis other circuits have, it nonetheless 
upholds the spirit of the ADA: building a more inclusive American society. 
Even this less formal analysis would have required the Seventh Circuit to 
grant A.H.’s request. A.H.’s participation was limited because—no matter 
his skill, work ethic, or training—he could never access an able-bodied 
student’s competitive opportunities. A.H., an elite, up-and-coming para-
ambulatory athlete,144 stood no chance in the face of fully able-bodied 
competitors.145 For para-ambulatory athletes with less skill than A.H., the 
prospects are even more disheartening. Because of their disability, no level 
of individual skill would propel them over the finish line to success. The 
existing IHSA divisions and qualifying times thus deter para-ambulatory 
participation. The creation of a separate para-ambulatory division would 
ensure that it was individual talent and skill—not medical-ambulation 
categories—that determine athletic success. 
Title IX’s implementing regulations offer helpful legal and policy 
frameworks to further understand and interpret the ADA’s meaningful-
access mandate in a high school sports context. Like female athletes in the 
pre-Title IX era, disabled student athletes face challenges of low 
participation and limited opportunities to meaningfully compete against 
their peers. And like Title IX, the Rehabilitation Act and ADA place 
affirmative obligations on state actors in the high school sports context.146 
In Title IX’s implementation, regulators explicitly rejected the opportunity 
to place a burden on women. Rather than require female student athletes to 
prove that but for their sex, they would have qualified for a men’s team, 
regulators created a presumption in favor of separate opportunities. Thus, 
affirmative Title IX obligations are triggered when opportunities have been 
historically limited, there is sufficient interest, and true integration cannot 
achieve meaningful opportunity.147 At the time of Title IX’s passage, 
regulators and activists believed these protections were necessary to ensure 
that female student athletes—despite physiological differences—would 
 
143.  See supra text accompanying note 59. 
144.  See supra text accompanying notes 79–80. 
145.  See supra text accompanying notes 87–91. 
146.  See supra text accompanying notes 28–29, 45–48. 
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have competitive opportunities equal to their male counterparts.148 Because 
the ADA and Rehabilitation Act place “like experience” mandates on 
covered entities,149 their application in the athletic context should look 
similar to that of Title IX.  
Taken together, the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits’ two-part 
meaningful-access ADA test and Title IX’s implementing regulations both 
evaluate anti-discrimination requirements through the lens of substantive 
equality. In both Title IX and non-athletic ADA contexts, anti-
discrimination is grounded in a substantive, rather than formal, 
understanding of equality.150 Substantive equality seeks to ensure that 
historical inequities are actually removed. This philosophical framework is 
particularly important where discrimination is perpetuated by physiological 
differences between the protected class and the non-protected class. In those 
contexts, blind formal equality cannot fulfill the spirit of anti-discrimination 
civil rights legislation.151 Rather, it will give the “hollow victory” that many 
women’s rights leaders feared would result during the earliest days of Title 
IX.152  
The two-part meaningful-access test likewise ensures substantive 
equality. Under this test, covered entities must first ask how a program or 
facility is used by nondisabled persons.153 Next, covered entities must take 
reasonable steps to ensure that disabled individuals have a like or 
comparable experience that is “as close as reasonably possible” to that 
enjoyed by nondisabled persons.154 When applied to Starbucks coffee shops, 
the court required the company to provide the “full and rewarding . . . 
experience” it offered to nondisabled patrons.155 This meant going beyond 
merely providing wheelchair-accessible seating, which would have satisfied 
demands for formal equality. Starbucks also had to provide wheelchair-
accessible seating that tendered equivalent opportunities for socialization as 
those offered to nondisabled clientele.156 Under the two-part test, equality is 
 
148.  See supra text accompanying notes 30–33. 
149.  See supra text accompanying notes 53–69. 
150.  See supra notes 16–17. 
151.  See supra notes 16–17. 
152.  See supra text accompanying note 30. 
153.  See supra text accompanying note 63. 
154.  See supra text accompanying note 69. 
155.  See supra text accompanying notes 66–69. 
156.  See supra text accompanying notes 68. 
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a holistic consideration. Title IX requires an analogous analysis. Covered 
entities consider how the program is—or was historically—used by male 
student athletes. For example, in track and field, male students raced against 
their physiologically similar peers. Next, the covered entities must take 
reasonable steps to ensure female students have a like experience: if there 
is interest in the sport, the covered entity must create a separate team. 
The but-for test, a form of blind integration, fails to solve the inequities 
that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act sought to remedy because it ignores 
the group nature of the protected class. Before Title IX, blind integration—
allowing female student athletes to try out for male teams—would not have 
solved pre-existing inequities.157 The status quo of women’s sports would 
have remained largely the same. 158 Substantive equality—the philosophical 
paradigm adopted by Title IX regulations—does not inquire about whether 
or not a particular female student athlete would have qualified for a team or 
won a state qualifying heat but for her sex. In that instance, it is quite 
possible that some would have. But such a but-for test would have ignored 
the need for female student athletes—as a group—to have the meaningful 
opportunity to compete against each other. The difference is even starker 
for para-ambulatory students, none of whom can qualify for the IHSA state 
championship.159 Refusing to compare the group of nondisabled students 
with the group of para-ambulatory students falls short of the mandates of 
the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Comparing opportunity by group—only 
one of which has the opportunity to qualify for the state championship—
would have led the Seventh Circuit to conclude that IHSA was denying 
meaningful access. The individual focus of the but-for test ignores the group 
nature of Title IX, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act protections. As Title IX’s 
implementing regulations demonstrated, accommodations for protected 
classes in the sports context must often come at the group level. High school 
athletic associations place similar group protections in other cases. There is 
generally an age limit on participation, preventing twenty-five-year-old men 
from racing against sixteen-year-old boys. Such an arrangement would deny 
the boys a meaningful opportunity to race against their peers. 
Like the physiological differences between male and female athletes, 
the physiological differences between disabled and nondisabled student 
 
157.  See supra text accompanying notes 30–35. 
158.  See supra text accompanying notes 30–32.  
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athletes threaten meaningful athletic program access for para-ambulatory 
participants. In the 1970s, a but-for approach to women’s sports equality 
would not have remedied the historic inequities that Title IX sought to 
solve.160 A formal equality for female student athletes and a but-for test for 
disabled student athletes are effectively the same. They both start with the 
presumption that separate teams are not necessary. Meaningfully equivalent 
experiences are not the objective. Under these frameworks, female student 
athletes could try out for male teams, and para-ambulatory students could 
try out for able-bodied teams. These “opportunities” would fulfill the Title 
IX and ADA mandates, while boxing the two groups in from obtaining 
meaningful access or participation. Despite failing in large numbers to make 
male varsity teams or succeed in state competitions, female student athletes 
would be unable to complain: they would have achieved formal equality.161 
Similarly, under the but-for test, disabled student athletes face the 
impossible burden of convincing a judge of a non-existent, unknowable 
alternate reality in which they are fully able-bodied.162 The but-for test takes 
the difference the ADA was designed to protect—disability—and uses it 
against para-ambulatory competitors. Rather than accepting a student’s 
disability in its own right, the judge requires the student to prove an alternate 
universe, or he is penalized for not being “disabled enough.”163 Similarly, a 
formal equality for women under Title IX would have taken the statute’s 
shield and used it as a sword. Women’s physiological differences would 
have prevented them from meaningfully competing on men’s teams, yet a 
formal equality approach to Title IX would have allowed this to pass anti-
discrimination muster. If implemented through this structure, Title IX’s 
goals would have likely been crippled by “sham” tryouts and hollow 
victories for women interested in playing sports.164 Male athletic directors 
would likely have allowed women to try out against men—thus following 
the letter of the law—while ultimately cutting them for being too slow or 
 
160.  See supra text accompanying notes 25–27. 
161.  See supra text accompanying note 31. 
162.  See supra text accompanying note 110–111. 
163.  The IHSA offers a separate division for “wheelers,” wheelchair-bound student athletes. See supra 
text accompanying note 83. But disabled athletes who nonetheless retain some degree of ambulation are 
effectively deemed “not disabled enough” to warrant protection and are forced to compete against fully 
able-bodied students, rather than their own physiologically similar peers. Id. 
164.  See supra text accompanying note 30. 
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too small to compete.165 It would have been nearly impossible for women 
to definitively prove that but for some aspect of their sex, they would have 
made a team or won a tournament. Thus, for women’s rights activists in the 
1970s, a so-called “blind equality” was inadequate.  
For both gender and disability, a blind equality approach improperly 
burdens the marginalized group. Blind equality would have burdened 
women by forcing them to consistently fail in tryouts against men. 
Conscious of the risks, regulators opted to create a sex-based classification 
to reduce the likelihood that “boys would dominate the girls’ programs and 
deny them an equal opportunity to compete in interscholastic events.”166 By 
grounding the implementing regulations in substantive rather than formal 
equality, Title IX’s regulators sought to level the playing field for women, 
granting them meaningful opportunity without promising equal outcomes. 
For female student athletes, a system of formal equality would have closely 
paralleled the sports regime A.H. faced. In that regime, female student 
athletes could have competed, but they would have had to compete against 
men and—thus—would not have had the meaningful opportunity to obtain 
similar benefits. The equality would have been very formal: male and 
female student athletes would have competed against each other for the 
same slots on the same teams. Recognizing that such a system would lead 
to little improvement in the life of women, regulators instead opted for the 
substantive equality that seeks to offer male and female student athletes the 
opportunity for equivalent experiences.167 Similarly, discrimination against 
para-ambulatory student athletes such as A.H. has been historically based, 
at least in part, on substantive physiological differences that affect the 
protected class’s ability to participate in a program or activity. At its core, 
the ADA was guided by this understanding: the physical differences 
between disabled and nondisabled persons affect how each group 
experiences life, interacts with society, and accesses programs and 
resources. Like Title IX, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act sought to reduce 
the severity of these effects—not by giving persons with disabilities a 
competitive advantage, but by leveling an inequitable playing field.168 To 
 
165.  See supra text accompanying note 31. 
166.   See supra text accompanying note 33. 
167.  See discussion supra Section II.A. 
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fulfill the spirit of civil rights legislation, substantive—rather than 
formalistic—equality should be the legal and policy goal. 
Because Title IX’s implementing regulations only require covered 
entities to create separate teams when there is sufficient demonstrated 
interest, the creation of a separate division or qualifying times for para-
ambulatory student athletes would not create an unwieldy administrative or 
financial burden. The ADA places limits on its integration mandate. 
Covered entities must provide reasonable accommodations to persons with 
disabilities, but they are not required to offer accommodations that change 
the fundamental nature of the program.169 Thus, any reasonable 
accommodation for para-ambulatory student athletes must fall within these 
bounds. As A.H. established in his complaint, the creation of separate para-
ambulatory divisions or distinct qualifying times has been successfully 
implemented in other states without substantial administrative or financial 
burdens.170 The IHSA itself has even created a separate wheelchair racing 
division without these burdens.171 Further, it would not open the floodgates 
for an endless number of new divisions. Such an onslaught of new divisions 
might change the fundamental nature of the program, as each student would 
essentially be competing against him- or herself. However, to be classified 
as a para-ambulatory athlete, the student must undergo a medical diagnosis, 
based on specific criteria.172 These criteria serve a limiting function.173 Title 
IX’s regulations create a functionally equivalent limit. Administrators are 
only required to create a separate female team when the three eligibility 
criteria are triggered.174 In the Title IX context, this regulation opened doors 
for women, but it did not open floodgates for administrators. In practice, it 
has not required the creation of a corollary female team for every kind of 
 
169.  See supra text accompanying note 113. 
170.  See Complaint, supra note 39, at 12 (noting that at least three states—California, Louisiana, and 
Oregon—have created “time standard accommodations for [para-ambulatory] students in track and 
field” that are similar to those A.H. requested). 
171.  See supra text accompanying note 114–116. 
172.   See supra text accompanying note 84. 
173.  While this Note does not advocate specific mandatory policy lines, there are a variety of options 
that state high school sports associations could adopt to prevent a floodgates effect. For example, states 
could require a critical mass of eligible athletes before creating a division, similar to Title IX’s 
requirements. They could require the sport—e.g., track—to be directly affected by the athlete’s para-
ambulation. Thus, this would not necessarily require states to create separate para-ambulatory divisions 
for shooting sports and other sports unaffected by ambulation.  
174.  See supra text accompanying note 29. 
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sport played at every school in the country. It has not undermined the 
competitiveness of high school athletics. Thus, in A.H.’s case, applying this 
interpretive framework would have only placed an affirmative mandate on 
IHSA to create a new track division or separate qualifying times. 
Courts should begin to use Title IX as guidance in crafting meaningful 
access mandates in high school sports. This legal analysis would not have 
created an affirmative mandate to implement new divisions or state 
championship qualifying times for every athletic competition in the state. 
The creation of new divisions or qualifying times would be administratively 
manageable because of the limiting factors of Title IX, which include 
prerequisites like “a reasonable expectation of . . . competition for [the] 
team” and “sufficient interest and ability . . . to sustain a viable team.” 
Additionally, A.H.’s case would have required only the creation of one new 




Where a para-ambulatory student athlete voluntarily176 requests the 
opportunity, federal courts should find that high school athletic associations 
have an affirmative obligation to create a separate division or qualifying 
times for para-ambulatory athletes. When delineating the ADA’s 
meaningful access mandate’s applicability to covered entities, courts should 
look to the two-part test and Title IX’s implementing regulations as 
guidance for what constitutes truly meaningful participation, rather than the 
but-for test. In A.H.’s case and others, this means adopting a broad 
definition of “program or activity.” For A.H., the “program” in which he 
sought to participate was the opportunity to compete against his peers.177 
To fulfill the ADA’s integration and inclusion mandate,178 this 
interpretation should be one that empowers rather than restricts persons with 
 
175.  A female para-ambulatory athlete would likely be able to also assert a right to compete in a female 
para-ambulatory athlete division or qualifying time. Because this Note’s analysis is limited to sex- and 
disability-based physical distinctions, separate divisions for student athletes would likewise be limited 
to those based on sex and physical disability (i.e., para-ambulation and wheeling), all umbrellas that 
encompass vast swaths of student athletes. 
176.  This is to ensure that paternalistic approaches, the historical norm, are not re-entrenched. See supra 
text accompanying note 46. 
177.  See supra text accompanying notes 118–122. 
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disabilities. As they do now, these athletes should still have the opportunity 
to try out for the fully able-bodied team or race in the fully able-bodied 
division. The ADA was intended to open doors, not close them. Thus, 
nothing in this proposal requires a para-ambulatory athlete to compete in 
that division or under those qualifying times. Such a requirement would 
violate the ADA’s mandate that covered entities provide these services in 
the most integrated manner possible.179 Similarly, Title IX requires schools 
to allow girls to try out for boys’ teams, although that requirement does not 
apply to contact sports.180 Thus, Title IX strikes a balance between the goals 
of integration and substantive equality, which should inform judges as they 
interpret the balancing act of the ADA. 
Eligibility for participation in a para-ambulatory division or competing 
under distinct qualifying times should be based on medical evaluations and 
objective physical criteria.181 As in other para-ambulatory athletics contexts, 
these criteria will ensure equity and fairness among competitors. They will 
also serve as objective criteria defining the “peer group” against whom para-
ambulatory athletes would compete.182 
Nothing in this proposal prevents persons with disabilities from seeking 
other, individualized reasonable accommodations—such as modified 
starting blocks—to be able to compete in the fully able-bodied division or 
qualifying time. These participatory decisions must be made autonomously 
by each individual para-ambulatory student athlete. While this paper 
analyzed the track-and-field context—through the lens of A.H. v. IHSA—
the proposal can be applied to other individual athletic events in which 
ambulation is implicated, such as swimming, while other events, like 
shooting sports, would likely not be implicated. This proposal offers high 





In Illinois—and in every state without the protections A.H. sought—
para-ambulatory high school student athletes are denied meaningful access 
 
179.  See supra text accompanying notes 45–47. 
180.  See supra text accompanying note 24. 
181.  See supra text accompanying note 84. 
182.  See supra text accompanying notes 118–122. 
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to an activity in which their able-bodied peers routinely participate. While 
able-bodied student athletes compete for slots in the state championship, 
para-ambulatory athletes like A.H. face a different reality. Regardless of 
effort, practice, or drive, their disabilities are an absolute bar to state 
championship qualification.183 The Seventh Circuit’s analysis improperly 
burdens these para-ambulatory students with a but-for test.184 Instead of this 
analysis, para-ambulatory students should have the presumptive 
opportunity to compete against their peers, either in a separate division or 
with distinct qualifying times. 
The right to compete against one’s physiological peers is a right that has 
been enshrined for female student athletes through Title IX.185 Prior to Title 
IX’s passage, female athletes could either compete against male athletes or 
not compete at all. But with Title IX’s implementing regulations, results-
oriented equality—rather than “formal gender neutrality”—ensured that 
female student athletes would have opportunities meaningfully equivalent 
to their male counterparts.186 Prior to Title IX, physiological differences 
between men and women prevented women from having a meaningful 
opportunity to compete. By creating separate teams and divisions, Title IX’s 
implementing regulations ensured that women have an equal opportunity to 
compete—and win. Faced with similar historic disadvantages, disabled 
student athletes should be given similar protections. The holistic body of 
related civil rights law—from Title IX to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act 
to existing disability-rights case precedent—demands that disabled students 
be given meaningful access.187 The meaningful-access standard ensures that 
civil rights enforcement is not merely an empty, formalistic shell. Rather, 
meaningful access demands courts and covered entities critically evaluate 
the experience of able-bodied persons and then work to offer disabled 
persons a like experience.188 
American civil rights law stands at a crossroads. Federal courts shaping 
the future of meaningful access for persons with disabilities have two paths 
from which to choose. The Seventh Circuit chose the path of empty, 
 
183.   See supra text accompanying notes 86–90. 
184.   See supra text accompanying notes 102–104. 
185.   See supra text accompanying note 29. 
186.  See supra text accompanying note 18. 
187.   See discussion supra Sections II.A–B. 
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formalistic equality when it adopted the but-for test.189 Substantive equality 
for persons with disabilities remains elusive within that jurisdiction, but the 
two-part analysis employed by other circuits offers hope that substantive 
equality may win the day. Ultimately, federal courts can do for disabled 
student athletes what federal regulators did for female student athletes: use 
the power of civil rights law to ensure meaningful opportunity. Over time, 
if substantive equality prevails, disabled students may have access to the 
revolutionary power of vast numbers of a historically marginalized group 
participating in sports.190
 
189.  See supra text accompanying notes 102–104. 
190.   See supra text accompanying notes 34–35. 
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